Introduction
The absence of``a right to know'' and little conception of stakeholder interests distinguish the context for environmental management in newly industrialising from Western business environments. Surveillance of business organisations beyond their home region has increased through the activities of Western campaign groups, assisted by the use of the Internet for information diffusion (Lempriere et al., 1996) . Such activity has had most impact on the overseas operations of Western multinationals, but even amongst the largest transnational corporations there are few which have taken steps to ensure common standards between headquarters and overseas affiliates (Hansen and Gleckman, 1993, p. 763) . Cost pressures, customer awareness, supply chain relations and the activities of environmental campaigners encourage participation in environmental initiatives (Bayliss et al., 1997) . These conditions are generally lacking in new and still developing industrial societies, as illustrated in this paper through a case study of corporate environmental reporting in Singapore.
Environmentally and economically newly industrialising economies (NIEs) such as Singapore are of particular interest to Western governments, business and citizens. Environmentally, NIEs have experienced substantial environmental degradation, locally and affecting the global commons, with their resource demands extending over their surrounding region (Bello and Rosenfeld, 1990; McFarlane, 1998) . In the case of Singapore, the ecological footprint extends over tropical environments undergoing largescale destruction (Brookfield and Byron, 1993; Greer, 1998) . Economically, living standards match those of many older industrial economies but typically without comparable environmental regulation and awareness (Lempriere et al., 1996) . This stands as an anomaly to the usual expectation that rising living standards are associated with stricter environmental controls. Without such correlation, lax environmental regimes can effectively act as an export subsidy (Bryant and Bailey, 1997) .
The emphasis on top-down hierarchical governmental systems with a mistrust of public involvement in decision making has slowed environmental improvement amongst developing Asia Pacific countries (Howard, 1993; MacAndrews, 1994) . This constraint is evident in Singapore where the low level of environmental reporting by companies partly reflects a political environment that constrains citizen demands for information and minimises regulatory pressure on companies. The benchmark survey of corporate environmental reporting provided in this paper gives a measure of this activity and identifies priorities for accelerating commitment to the new business-environment paradigm. Before presenting this assessment, the next sections provide an introduction to the significance of disclosure and the context for disclosure in Singapore.
Environmental disclosure
Amongst Western business, environmental disclosure first emerged in North America in the 1970s as part of a short-term interest in social reporting (Gray, 1994) . The practice was revived in the late 1980s with the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro being credited as an influential leader (Collier, 1995; Brophy and Starkey, 1996) . New legislation in Norway had required environmental reporting. Norsk Hydro responded with quantitative data and significant detail, including admittance of non-compliance. Mandatory disclosure remains the exception (accounting regulations in the USA require information on the cost of compliance with important, disclosure is a source of documentary evidence that can be used by external parties to evaluate company performance. The willingness by company managers to open the organisation to external scrutiny is often viewed as a necessary first step in obtaining business commitment to environmentally sustainable forms of business activity. This paper compares Western experience with environmental disclosure to that in Singapore. Information on environmental disclosure in Singapore is presented from a review of company annual reports (covering two years 1995/96 and 1996/97) and the responses to a questionnaire survey covering all public listed companies in Singapore. The surveys reveal a low commitment to environmental disclosure amongst Singapore organisations. Reasons for the low interest in disclosure are explained. Possible public policy responses and options for changing current business attitudes toward disclosure are outlined.
environmental regulations) but the practice has diffused widely. As well as comment in the company annual report, separate corporate environment reports are now provided by many larger Western companies.
In 1993, a survey covering 690 leading companies from ten countries in Europe and North America found that 85 per cent referred to environmental issues in their annual reports (KPMG cited in Collier, 1995, p. 122) . A survey of 570 UK annual reports in 1993 found that 26 per cent addressed environmental issues. The practice remains comparatively low amongst smaller and less pollution intensive industries but the UK survey found that the proportion of companies disclosing environmental information was growing by over 10 per cent a year (Collier, 1995, p. 124 ). The growth in disclosure partly reflects how it can be used to assist an organisation's image as well as to inform stakeholders. Thus in the KPMG survey only a fifth of reporting organisations included quantitative data in their disclosure. Bad news (environmental incidents, prosecutions, non-compliance) was reported in slightly less than 10 per cent of disclosures while the results of environmental audits were rarely referred to. The variability and selective nature of information release questions the significance of this activity (ACCA, 1998) . Grounds for regarding disclosure as an indicator of business commitment to environmental improvement are: 1 The quality of disclosure made by an individual company generally increases with experience with a large gap evident between best practice organisations and laggards (ACCA, 1998) . The gap between early and late adopters reflects the novelty of disclosure and its reliance on individual experience and investment in information collection and reporting systems. 2 The expected standard of reporting has increased with both environmental and business organisations encouraging greater commitment to the publication of logical, honest and quantified data (Collier, 1995, p. 123) . Guidelines on good practice have been promoted, including guidance from business director working parties, and while most reporting fails to meet the suggested standards performance is improving. An expectation that some form of corporate environmental reporting may become mandatory is part of this trend (Gray et al. cited in Brophy and Starkey, 1996, p. 184) . By reporting voluntarily an organisation can build up expertise in advance of expected regulation. 3 Disclosure is an additional driver for organisations to focus on environmental improvement. Environmental reporting is most widely practised where companies are required to collect relevant data for other purposes, as reporting then makes use of existing investment rather than adding significant additional costs (Brophy and Starkey, 1996, p. 184) . On the other hand, disclosure has acquired a status as an environmental initiative in its own right and some organisations may modify environmental investment to generate material for reporting. 4 A key weakness in the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management systems is the absence of a public reporting requirement (Krut and Gleckman, 1998 (Collier, 1995, p. 127 ).
The Singapore environment
The city state of Singapore covers around 650 sq.km (extensive land reclamation programmes continue to modify the full land area) and has a permanent resident population of close to 3 million. The population density is high and its living standards the highest in South-east Asia with GNP per capita currently around US$28,000. Average population density in residential areas is over 35,000 persons per sq.km reflecting how the government has given economic activities priority over living space: since political independence in the mid-1960s the proportion of the island given for housing (13 per cent) has remained static while the area for industry, commerce and communications has expanded from around 10 per cent to 25 per cent of the land area (Neville, 1993) . Land extensive activities are important to the economy, including sea and air transport services, marine engineering and petrochemicals.
A report prepared for the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (held in Stockholm) found evidence of widespread pollution from industrial and household waste and alerted the government to the urgent economic need to strengthen environmental regulation (WWICFS, 1972) . The subsequent development of environmental controls has emphasised the environment as an economic factor in three ways (Bankoff and Elston, 1994) . First, as Singapore's economic development is highly dependent on international capital and overseas markets, it behoves the government to be aware of changes in, and to attempt to conform to, internationally accepted environmental standards. Thus, Singapore is a signatory of international treaties such as the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, an important treaty for Singapore in view of the then widespread use of chlorofluorocarbons in its electronics industry. Second, environmental improvement is part of the``increasingly strong economic imperative'' to meet the environmental aspirations and recreational demands of skilled and mobile professional and managerial workers in order to stem the small but significant out-migration of these key participants. Third, with increasing worldwide interest in eco and heritage tourism, the environment is now perceived as a profitablè`c ommodity in its own right'' This possibility is reflected in the designation of nature reserves and tolerance of the campaigning activities of the Nature Society, one of the few examples of an NGO that has openly challenged government decisions (Perry et al., 1997, pp. 169-70) .
These various initiatives have enabled Singapore to promote itself as a``clean, green city'' (see Ministry of Environment, 1992) but leave four main gaps in its environmental regime. First, the otherwise comprehensive environmental legislation omits a commitment to a formal EIA process, in contrast to other South-east Asian countries (Briffett, 1996) . Government unwillingness to introduce EIA reflects concerns about its potential to delay or inhibit development, increase development costs and introduce``extraneous issues'' into the development process. Rather than a transparent and contestable decision-making process, development decisions are made through internalised decision making under the control of state development agencies and senior government ministers (Bankoff and Elston, 1994) . Advocates of EIA suggest that its absence has stifled public debate about the environment and has resulted in inadequate attention being given to environmental considerations (Hesp, 1995; Hilton and Manning, 1995) . Second, thè`g reen initiatives'' fostered by the government's environmental agencies have not incorporated ecological principles. For example, the Nature Society has criticised the areas selected as nature reserves on the grounds that most are of no ecological significance while areas important to migratory wildlife and endemic species have been taken for development (Hesp, 1995, p. 139) . Similarly while the parks and roadside planting of trees has given a green appearance, the vegetation is typically exotic and unhelpful to native fauna (Corlett, 1992) . Third, public environmental consciousness over issues such as product recycling, green consumerism and ecological awareness is low. Recent surveys of environmental behaviour among Singaporean students and women have shown that Singaporeans are generally ignorant of and resistant to incorporating environmentally friendly practices in everyday life such as minimising domestic waste, using recycling bins and buying environmentally friendly products (Lau, 1993; Ng, 1994; Savage, 1995) . Four, there has been little development of an environmental leadership role by Singapore public or private agencies in the region despite its economic wealth and trade dependencies on neighbouring countries. The widespread destruction of tropical rainforest in Indonesia through deliberate land clearance, which resulted in much of South-east Asia being shrouded in smoke pollution for several months in 1997, may have been an opportunity to demonstrate such leadership. Such leadership was not demonstrated although several measures were suggested to the Singapore government (Shepherd, 1997) . Similarly, although Singapore has a major stake in the shipping and petroleum industries, it has been less important than Japan in promoting marine environment initiatives in the region (Chia, 1995) .
The capacity to comply with and evade environmental regulation varies between different types of business. This variability raises particular issues in Singapore where the economy is sharply divided between three main types of business organisation: 1 Foreign multinationals: Singapore has an unusually high dependence on foreignowned companies. In the early 1990s, branches and affiliates of foreign multinationals accounted for 70 per cent of exports and 40 per cent of employment (Perry et al., 1997, p. 15) . This investment has brought to Singapore many of the world's leading multinationals whose (Yeung, 1994) . Opinions differ over the distinctive organisational attributes of Chinese business but it is generally associated with traditional values arising from the deference to family elders and a preference for simple management structures (Redding, 1990) . This has often resulted in businesses that are weak in professional management, lacking in systematic performance information and resistant to outside surveillance (PERC, 1997; Suehiro, 1997) . The fact of being Chinese owned in a region where they are an ethnic minority accentuates the preference to maintain a low profile (Koike, 1993) .
Methodology of the study
The environmental policy context aligned with the particular business population suggested that environmental disclosure would be low compared with Western practice. To test this expectation, the first stage of the study comprised an examination of the annual reports of all Singapore registered public companies as listed on the stock exchange in June 1996. For these 264 companies, two consecutive reports were examined (financial years 1995/96 and 1996/97) using the following criterion to identify disclosure:
Any environment-related information reported by companies in their annual reports. The information need not be found in a specific environmental section, but the intention must be a genuine attempt by the company to communicate their environmental performances affecting issues such as resource use, emission levels, waste minimisation and employee and management participation in environmental programmes.
This criterion was used to exclude incidental references to the environment (such as where one report stated that``upgrading of plant machinery in conjunction with the relocation of our primary process resulted in higher productivity and reduced waste'') and required evidence of explicit environmental improvement actions amongst companies involved in environmental services (thus a processor of industrial waste citing its aim to commence waste oil recycling was considered an operational issue). Levels of disclosure were assessed by sector (distinguishing high, medium and low environmental risk activities) and size of company (measured by financial assets). Guidelines to evaluate the content of disclosure statement were obtained from the standards used by the UK Association of Chartered Certified Accountants to adjudicate their environmental reporting award (Elkington and SpencerCooke, 1996) . The second stage of the investigation sought explanation for the level of reporting. It utilised a postal questionnaire sent to 252 of the 264 companies whose reports had been assessed (for the 12 omitted companies Singapore was a secondary reporting location). The survey was sent to the company secretary, finance manager, communications manager or other individual suggested by the organisation in a prior telephone call to the company. Separate surveys were designed for disclosing and non-disclosing organisations. For disclosing organisations, the questionnaire obtained information on:
. future reporting intentions;
. scope of reporting considered appropriate;
[ 313 ] . comparative priority to environment versus other business responsibilities.
The survey for non-disclosing organisations collected comparable data with respect to the latter issues as well as the reasons for their non-disclosure and the influences that would cause this to change. In addition, representatives of three Western multinational companies operating in Singapore were selected from amongst those known to be active reporters in their home country. These interviews investigated attitudes to information release in Singapore and how the pressures for disclosure were perceived to differ from those in their home region. In addition representatives of relevant stakeholder organisations with a potential interest in business-environment issues were interviewed to identify their assessment of current disclosure practice and how, if at all, they thought it might be encouraged. These stakeholder groups included business groups (Singapore Confederation of Industries, Singapore Hotels Association, Singapore International Chambers of Commerce, Singapore Association for Environmental Companies), the Nature Society and government agencies (Ministry of Environment and the Singapore Environment Council).
Disclosure in annual reports
Less than 10 per cent of reports in either financial year included environmental information and the proportion reporting in two years was 6.5 per cent. These data indicate low and not significantly increasing levels of reporting. Disclosure was significantly greater amongst the larger organisations: the top 50 companies provide almost half of the disclosers while the top 100 encompasses almost three-quarters. A chi-square test confirmed a positive relationship existed between financial rank and disclosure (w 2 = 14.465 significant at 0.001 level). On the other hand, no relationship was found between disclosure and the pollution intensity of the organisation (w 2 = 0.056). Amongst companies in high environmental risk sectors that did not disclose were shipyard companies (Jurong, Keppel, Hitachi Zosen and Sembawang), and cement manufacturers (Jurong Cement, Ssangyong Cement).
Amongst all reporting organisations the extent of disclosure was minimal. Two thirds of the reports with environmental references had no more than two sentences of comment. There were two companies that reported in both years with over ten sentences of information (a property company, DBS Land, and a car distribution company, Cycle and Carriage) but in both cases the information provided was uninformative. In one of DBS Land's environmental sections, for example, there was an extended description of the opening ceremony for a recently completed hotel while its preceding year's section concentrated on how the integration of a golf course in a housing scheme demonstrated commitment to environmental preservation. Cycle and Carriage's disclosure focused on the environmental performance of the vehicles sold rather than their own organisational performance. Across all cases of disclosure, only one report made reference to the company (ABN AMRO Holdings) having an environmental policy (without disclosing the policy) while there were no references to environmental audits or reviews having been completed. Five companies reported the attainment of ISO 14001 certification or the setting up of an environment management system but without providing any information of the changes either initiative implied. Other criteria of good reporting practice were absent: apart from a few figures reported in percentage terms, there were no quantitative data; no progress against targets was given; information was often incidental to the businesses core activity (for example, a shipping company, CWT Distribution, reported only on its paper recycling effort); financial implications or life cycle concepts were absent. Typically claims were uninformative, as in the case of the Broadway Industry Group that emphasised how its moulded-fibre products were completely recyclable but without advising on the extent of recycling being achieved. Three reports cited action to comply with environmental laws but only one (Wearnes International) reported that it was exceeding the minimum requirement.
Explaining non-disclosure
The company survey obtained a 30 per cent response from non-disclosing companies (66 completed questionnaires out of 221 dispatched) and a 45 per cent response from disclosing companies (14 completed questionnaires out of 31 despatched). These samples were broadly representative of all types and sizes of organisation. The responses suggest that there are three main reasons for non-disclosure, which equally explain the low commitment amongst disclosing organisations: 1 Lack of environmental awareness: the most frequent explanation given for non-disclosure was that the company had no environmental impact (Table I ). In addition, telephone checks with non-responding organisations found that the main reason for the non-response was a belief that environmental issues were not relevant to their organisation. On the other hand, when questioned specifically on the estimated environmental impact of their organisation, over three quarters of non-disclosing respondents (75.8 per cent) indicated that the environmental impacts of their organisation's activities were unknown. The willingness to provide a judgement on the organisation's environmental impact increased amongst disclosing organisations, although the high proportion (50 per cent) regarding their activities as``beneficial'' for the environment equally suggests limited environmental awareness. 2 Lack of perceived benefit: significantly more reporting companies associate environmental improvement with market opportunities and cost savings than nonreporting companies (Table II) . A large proportion of the non-disclosing organisations (over 40 per cent in each case) did not believe that investment in environmental improvement offered their organisation either opportunities for cost saving or improved support from shareholders. An even greater share (75.8 per cent) indicated that growing pressure to tackle environmental problems was perceived as``neither a threat nor an opportunity'' for their company. (Amongst the minority respondents on this issue, most perceived greater customer interest in environmental performance as a competitive opportunity.) The lack of perceived benefit was underlined by only half existing reporting companies indicating that environmental disclosure would be a regular practice in their annual report. The awareness that other companies do not report adds to the lack of interest. The second most frequent reason for not reporting was agreement that``firms in Singapore do not generally include such matters in their annual reports and until this happens, this company will not do so either''. Asked to identify the proportion of Singapore firms practising environmental reporting, almost 90 per cent of non-disclosing organisations making an estimate correctly identified the share as less than 10 per cent. When asked to make the same estimate in respect of companies in the UK, fewer than 10 per cent were in the best estimate range (20-29 per cent) but with a even split amongst those underand over-estimating. Thus a large cluster of firms appear aware that Singapore falls below international participation in environmental reporting. 3 Lack of government pressure: both reporting and non-reporting organisations identified the government as the single most direct driver of their reporting coverage (Table III) . The expectation of government direction was reinforced by the high proportion (42.9 per cent) of disclosing companies supporting mandatory environmental reporting in annual reports. Government ranked above the influence of business associations and was seen to be more important than resource availability or shareholder and investor pressure. Interestingly companies did not admit to concern with the release of information to the public. Two thirds of non-disclosing companies stated that they agreed with the disclosure in Norsk Hydro's environmental report that``the public has a right to information...if we have a problem it is also in our best interests that it is brought out into full public view''. Of course, this support for openness has to be judged against the current lack of disclosure and the limited conception of corporate environmental responsibilities. More positively, it suggests that strong governement instruction could overcome resistance and perceptions that environmental reporting is an unnecessary cost burden.
The absence of information to report would not seem to explain the low disclosure. Over half the non-disclosing respondents indicated that their organisation had recycling, energy conservation or waste minimisation programmes while over a third had resource use efficiency projects (the kinds of issues that reporting companies indicated were appropriate topics for disclosure). The low environmental awareness revealed from the judgement on the organisation's overall environmental impact (see above) suggests such initiatives may not have an environmental motivation but they do provide scope for reporting.
Foreign MNCs and stakeholder groups
Representatives of the three foreign MNCs interviewed indicated that the environmental commitment in their home region was not reflected in similar priority in Singapore. They suggested that this reflected the low level of interest in environmental issues in Singapore; as one environmental manager commented:``The level of awareness is very low. Who will care if you report environmental initiatives or not? No one will''. An organisation accredited to the European Eco Audit scheme, which requires that it prepares a site environmental report for all its locations, advised that without the certification requirement such reporting would be dropped in Singapore. The Singapore environmental manager cited as evidence of the lack of interest a request to refrain from sending their report to the town council covering their factory site. As the manager said:``Why create trouble for yourself when there is no requirement at all in Singapore to report such information to the public?''. Consequently the large contingent of foreign companies with environmental reporting experience are not being encouraged to play a leadership role. Stakeholder groups tend to be reluctant to campaign for greater business accountability. In comparison with the role played by the International Chamber of Commerce in promoting environmental best practice in Europe and North America (Hansen and Gleckman, 1993; Brophy and Starkey, 1996) , the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce has taken no stand on environmental matters reflecting the low interest in this issue expressed by its membership. The Singapore Environment Council, a government appointed education group with a remit to promote environmental awareness in the community and amongst business, similarly indicates that environmental reporting is not considered an issue of significance to Singapore. Its president is reported as saying that compliance with legislation provides the public with adequate assurance about company environmental performance (The Straits Times, 21 May 1993). The Council has promoted a revised version of the International Chamber of Commerce's Business Charter for Sustainable Development that omits eight clauses in the original version, including that which calls for companies to report annually on their environmental performance and progress. Disclosure, it was explained, would be seen as a threat, especially amongst Chinese family businesses who were thought to have a strong preference for secrecy and person-to-person communication rather than written declarations and formal agreements. The Nature Society, Singapore's only independent environmental NGO, has not taken up the issue of business environmental performance. It feels constrained to focus on issues immediately affecting the survival of Singapore's last remaining pockets of natural habitation. Although it achieved some success in the early 1990s, government influence over its activities has subsequently reduced its independence (Perry et al., 1997) .
Discussion
The absence of any cases approaching a serious commitment to disclosure is perhaps a more significant indicator of environmental apathy than the overall low disclosure rate. Singapore's public companies are small compared with the multinationals that have invested most in environmental reporting. On the other hand, the absence of reporting even amongst activities in pollution intensive activities can be seen as a shortfall compared with international practice. At present there is no legislation or official recommendation encouraging companies to disclose and without such requirements there appears little likelihood of disclosure increasing. Two arguments against mandating disclosure are: 1 that disclosure is not important; what matters is actual environmental performance; 2 that disclosure is a lesser priority than developing environmental management awareness; once management systems are in place, disclosure will follow.
The first of these viewpoints is reflected in the perspective of the Singapore Environment Council that legislative compliance provides adequate assurance of environmental performance. Such a viewpoint contrasts with the expectations in certified environmental management systems that companies aim for more than legislative compliance (Welford, 1996) . It is also arguably against the best interests of business in the context of generally increasing environmental standards, including the need for conformity with international environmental agreements. Moving beyond compliance minimum means that companies minimise the likelihood of being forced to adopt activity or change investment plans because of regulatory change. Indeed many international companies have incorporated this criterion into their environmental policy (Smart, 1992; Taylor and Welford, 1994) . Such leading edge companies recognise that they can gain a competitive advantage by exceeding compliance standards and that a focus on compliance can be costly and uninspiring to the organisation (Eden, 1996, p. 65) . Moreover, within Singapore regulatory non-compliance is significant and has increased during the 1990s. In 1994, 414 prosecutions for environmental offences were made mainly involving cases of contaminated waste and illegal release of effluent into water courses (The Straits Times, 14 July 1994) . Problems of marine pollution arising from the release of oil and other contaminants into public drains resulted in new legislation to control this activity in 1995. In this context there is scope for disclosure to be another means through which environmental responsibility can be encouraged. This has particular relevance in the context of the government's stated preference to rely increasingly on self-regulation rather than legislative enforcement.
The second perspective argues that disclosure will arise once companies start to adopt other environmental initiatives. This perspective was expressed by a representative of the Ministry of Environment who indicated that encouraging companies to obtain certification to ISO 14001 was a greater priority than disclosure. The two issues tended to be viewed as mutually exclusive in that calls for disclosure were thought likely to deter interest in environmental certification. This was not reflected in the findings of the questionnaire surveys, as suggested by the large agreement with the Norsk Hydro statement. In addition, amongst companies prepared to make a judgement (a third of non-disclosers and slightly over half of disclosers), the majority correctly identified that ISO 14001 does not require public disclosure of environmental impacts and performance. Moreover, in the context of a low level of participation in ISO 14001 (Tanner et al., 1997) , it again might be argued that encouragement to disclosure can be an effective incentive for obtaining certification. Once faced with greater expectations of information release, establishing an integrated environmental management system is a necessary response to assist the systematic collection and reporting of environmental performance. Moreover, it would be possible to commence the development of a reporting culture through non-threatening requirements: for example, through the release of information to industry associations which aggregate data for dissemination. Such an approach might also answer company concerns about the cost of reporting.
An increase in disclosure and improvement over the existing minimal disclosure statements appears unlikely without concerted demands on companies. There is a low conception of environmental responsibility and no perceived demand from government or shareholders and investors. The acquisition of ISO 14001 is unlikely to significantly change this. The number of companies obtaining certification is small and disproportionately foreign owned. Moreover, expectations of an equivalent growth in certification as achieved by ISO 9000 are misplaced (Krut and Gleckman, 1998 important action likely to encourage environmental reporting. Such action is not in prospect, but there are reasons to suggest that government action is not the immediate priority for changing company behaviour.
Environmental reporting will only become significant where stakeholders critically evaluate organisation performance and respond to it in their roles as investors, consumers, employees, neighbours or informed citizens. Surveys of environmental awareness amongst Singapore citizens suggest that understanding of environmental issues is comparable with that in Western countries (Tan et al., 1996) . As noted in the introduction, application of that understanding into changes in personal behaviour or expectations of organisational performance are less pronounced (Savage and Lau, 1993) . Green label products, for example, have had little impact even amongst affluent consumers (Wong, 1997) and surveys of Singapore students show little commitment to active or direct participation in environmental protection measures, whether buying recycled products, joining an environmental group, signing a petition or studying environmental subjects (Savage, 1998) . Changing this situation requires sustained investment to make people aware and conscious of ecological issues. In Singapore this also requires governmental acceptance of a broader role for civil society and some relaxation of its tight control of community activism (Tay, 1998 ). The``communitarian'' ideology of the Singapore government gives little space for local democracy and political action outside of officially controlled channels. As noted above, the Nature Society has been one of few independent NGOs allowed and after a number of high profile campaigns its activity has come under closer surveillance. Government prefers that it is left to set the environmental agenda. This has ensured compliance with international environmental issues necessary to sustain the economy's access to world markets, such as conformity to the Montreal protocol, whilst also sheltering companies from environmental demands ahead of competitor nations. Thus there has been no development of a``right to know'' culture with growing affluence and the emergence of a professional middle class (Jones and Brown, 1994; Rodan, 1996) .
Conclusion
Environmental disclosure within company annual reports has become an increasing expectation of environmental regulators and campaigners in industrial countries. It is an indicator of business commitment to environmental improvement to the extent that the disclosures report progress in implementing environmental programmes. Perhaps more important, disclosure is a source of documentary evidence that can be used by external parties to evaluate company performance. The willingness by company managers to open the organisation to external scrutiny is an important step in obtaining business commitment to environmentally sustainable forms of business activity. The low level of environmental disclosure in Singapore is symptomatic of the gap between the developing environmental responsibility accepted in Western countries and that in this newly industrialised economy. Raising interest in environmental reporting will depend on greater environmental consciousness amongst shareholders and consumers, which in turn will depend on greater development of an active citizenry motivated to voice expectations and expose organisations to critical scrutiny. For Western governments, business organisations and campaign groups concerned about inequalities in the diffusion of business environmental responsibility, assistance to raise the environmental consciousness of stakeholder groups in Singapore and newly industrialising economies is needed. Business organisations are unlikely to invest in reporting without a perceived need and benefit. The option of encouraging disclosure through mandatory regulations is typically unappealing to business, although subsequent compliance can be high. Educational initiatives aimed at investors and consumers are necessary to stimulate demand for disclosure and ensure that the reporting which emerges is significant and ultimately part of a change in business practice.
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